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TlHlE DOCTRINE OF A.CCOr\1IV10DAT10N IN THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
Arlin M. Adams and Sarah Barringer Gordon* 
INTRODUCTION 
The religion clauses o f  the first amendment read: " Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment  of religio n ,  or  prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. " 1 R atified i n  1791, the clauses were presumed to be a cohesive and 
harmonious protecti o n  of  religious liberty .  2 For almost a century after the 
clauses were appended to the Constitution ,  they excited relatively little 
cont roversy .  3 In the twentieth century,  however, there has been an explosion 
of  litigation challenging various state actions as violating the establishment 
clause,  the free exercise clause ,  or both . 
This growth i n  religion clause litigation has resulted in a corresponding 
expansion in establishment and free exercise jurisprudence . 4  The complexities 
* Arlin M. Adams-Judge, United States Court o f  Appeals for t h e  Third C ircuit 1969-
87; J.D., University of Pennsylvania 1947; :'v1.A., Temple University 1950; B.S. Tem p l e  U ni­
versity 1941. Sarah Barringer Gordon-Assoo::iate, Fine, Kaplan and Black, Philadelphia, Pa; 
La'v Clerk to Judge Adams 1986-87; M.A.R. (Ethics). Yale Divinity Sch ool 1987; J.D., Yale 
Law School 1986; B.A., Vassar College 1982. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend . I .  
2 .  T h e  religion clauses were supported b y  a union o f  b o t h  rati onalists and p ietists. 
Rat ionalists, such as Thomas Jefferson ::md James IV1adison , sought p rotection for government 
from what they claimed were the corrupting and largely irrational  innuences of relig ion. Pietists, 
on the other hand, wished to shield their religious communities from the depredations of 
government. Each g r o u p  believed t hat the religion clauses together created a cohesive and 
int ernally consistent system of religious liberty. Mead. American Protestantism During the 
Revolutionary Epoch, in R.EUGION I:--.' AMERICAN HISTORY: l�lTERPRETIVE EssAYS 165-66 (.!. 
Mulder & ]. Wilson eds. 1978). See also;'>!. HowE, THE GARDEI" AND THE WILDERNESS 5-15 
(1965) (Supreme Court has misinterpreted religion clauses by disregarding theological roots o f  
American p rinciples o f  separation); L .  T?.IBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 1 4-2 l O  -3, a t  
1154-66 (1988) (providing in-depth anaylysis as well a s  history o f  religion clauses); infra notes 
20-22, and 95. 
3. Permoli v. Munici pali ty No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) is t h e  only 
major case involving the religion clauses prior to the Mom10n p olygamy cases of t h e  late 1870's 
and 1880's. Permoli involved a city ordinance prohibiting transportation of corpses to any 
Catholic church for the ce!eb!ation of funerals. The Court appl ied the rule of Banon v. The 
;\'layer & City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243 (1833), which held t hat the free exercise clause 
die! not apply to state governments, and concluded that the city ordinance did not ·,-iolate th e 
free exercise clause, because the clause was directed exclusively at federal actions. 
-\. Compilation of a two-volume casebook by Hon. A..rlin [vJ. Adams and Charles Emme1·ich, 
former Director of t h e  Center for Church State Studies at DePaul University, funded in part 
by the University of Pennsylvania and to be published by the University of Pennsylvania Press, 
is currently in the f inal stages prior to publication. The casebook is expected to be published 
sometime in l9SS. 
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and inconsistencies of the law relating to the clauses prompted Chief  Justice 
Rehnquist to l ament recently that they have become a kind o f  Scylla and 
Charybdis , 5  evoking images of Ulysses'  perilous j ourney through the Straits 
o f  Messina . This i mage suggests that i f  the monster of establishment clause 
doctrine does not trap the umvary sailor,  the whirlpool of free exercise will . 
In comparing the j urisprudence of the clauses to Scylla and Charybdis , 
the Chief Justice criticizes much of the Supreme Court 's  doctrine , which has 
given a broad reading to both the estabiishment and the free exercise clauses . 6  
H e  maintains that each clause should be given a more narrow i nterpretation,  
so that neither wil l  overwhel m  the navigator .7 It  would perhaps be more 
appropriate to d raw an analogy between the establishment and free exercise 
clauses and twin beacons, designed to protect and preserve both government 
and religion .  These protections should not be mutually exclusive, and should 
allow for neutral territory between the two poles . Sailors should be able to 
plot a safe p assage between the twin points of establishment and free exercise .  
It  is  the width and depth o f  this passage that w e  address here. Commonly 
known as the ' 'permissible zone of accommodation'' of religion, t h e  space 
between the clauses aliows government voluntarily to accommodate the 
religious beliefs of citizens. An accommodation, therefore, respects the 
religious pluralism of the American people, without undermi ning the concept 
o f  anti-establishment . The zone bet'vveen the two clauses has been the subject 
of considerable commentary and controversy .8 This article is one more 
attempt to enter this formidable area . · 
I. THE CoNCEPT oF PERMISSIBLE AccoMMODATION 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a permissible "zone of 
accommodatio n "  exists i n  the gray area between governmental actions that 
5 .  Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. /0"7, 721 (1981 )  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("By 
broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has constantiy narrowed the channel ... through 
which any state or federal action iTIUSt pass if' order to survive constitutional scrutiny."). 
6. Included in the critique are free exercise cases such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), both of which mandated state 
unemployment benefits for religious individuals who refused to work at certain times or on 
certain products because of their faith. On the establishment side, reference is made to cases 
involving aid to parochial schools, such as Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U.S. 602 (1973), and 
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty 'i. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). The charge is 
that these cases were decided incorrectly on the basis of an " overly expansive" interpretation 
of the establishment claus'". 450 U.S. at 721-25. 
7. 450 U.S. at 726-27. 
8. Included among the many works that deal with a::commodation doctrine are Choper, 
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling th2 Conflict, 4! U. PnT. L. REv. 
673 ( 1980); Giannella, Religious Liberty, l·!onesiab!ishmqnf, and Doctrinal Deveiopmenr: Pan 
f. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. P ..EV. 1381 (1967); !(url8.nd.) :...7)' c�,.:u;.rch and 
State and the Supreme Cmm, 29 U. CHI L. REv. i (i961); McConnell, Accommodei!ion of 
Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1; Oaks. Separatio;;, Accommodmion and :he ,::.-z.ture of Church 
and S!C!ie. 35 DE PAm. L. REv. l (1985); Schwarz, No Imposition of.P.eligion: The Establishmenr 
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 1 4-4, at 1l66; 1-.!ote, Permissible 
,A cconunodarions qf Religion: Reconsidering th::: t\few York Get Sranne, 96 Y :\LE L. J. 1 l 47 
(1987) [hereinafter r·�ote. !-lew York Get Stature]. 
i . i 
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violate the establishment clause and individual religious rights protected by 
the free exercise c lause . In Zorach v.  Clauson/ written by Justice Douglas 
in 1952, the Supreme Court upheld a released-time program that permitted 
public school children to be dismissed from class in order to receive religious 
instruct ion at parochial schools and churches . The Court reasoned that the 
arrangement did not violate the establishment clause,  b ecause it accommo­
dated rather than advanced religious interests .10 Actions that fall within the 
zone of permissible accommodation adj ust governmental regulations t o  the 
religious needs o f  citizen s ,  Justice Douglas reaso ned, without transgressing 
the prohibitions of the establishment claus e .  
"Permissible accommodation" may t h u s  be defined a s  an area o f  allowable 
governmental deference to the religious requirements of a pluralistic society 
in which a variety o f  religious beliefs are deeply held . This kind o f  voluntary 
accommodation should not be confused with the judicial or scholarly refer­
ences to accommodation required by the free exercise clause . When Chief 
Justice Burger spoke i n  Lynch v. Donnelly'' of the affirmative mandate to 
accommodate imposed on government by the free exercise guarantee, 12 he 
was not discussi ng permi ssible accommodation but rather mandatory accom­
modati o n .  The former Chief Justice was referring to the p rinciple that if a 
free exercise right is determined to h ave been infringed , government must 
accommodate the right , unless a compelling and narrowly tailored state 
interest j ustifies the infringement . This kind of court-ordered accommodation 
is an implementation o f  the free exercise clause and should not be equated 
with the voluntary accommodation to which this article i s  addressed . 
Also distinguishable from the permiss ible accommodation analyzed i n  this  
article is  governmental action that violates t he establishment clause,  o ften 
referred to as " forbidden " or  "impermissible" accommodation . 13 Forbidden 
accommodation i s  in fact a term describing g overnmental action that has 
gone beyond the b ounds of  allowable deference to religious expression and 
belief, to actual endorsement of a particular religion. Forbidden accommo­
dation is a wolf in sheep ' s  clothing, as it  were , since it is  a term used to 
describe an establishment masquerading as an accommodatio n .  Thus , im­
permiss ible accommodation is s omething of a contradiction in terms, because 
it infr inges on the citizenry ' s  right to a government that adheres to the non­
establishment principle . 
9. 343 U . S .  306 ( 1 95 2 ) .  
10. !d. a t  314- 1 5 .  
II. 465 U . S .  668 ( 1 984) , reh'g denied, 466 U . S .  994 ( 1 984) . 
1 2 .  465 U . S .  at 67 3 .  
1 3 .  See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc . ,  472 U . S .  703, 710- 1 1 ( 1 9 8 5 )  (statut e  that  
singled out Sabbath o bservers for  accommodation violated establishment c l ause); Abington 
School Dis t .  v. Schempp,  374 U . S .  203, 294 ( 1 963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (courts must  draw 
line between "permissible and impermissible" accommodations to accord w i t h  h istory and 
reflect understanding of Founding Fathers). 
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The Z orach decision was immediately cont roversial , especially because 
four years earlier the Court had struck down a simi lar program .14 But  the 
more enduring controversy arising from Zorach has been over the meaning 
and wisdom of the newly-discovered accommodation doctrin e .  In t h e  period 
since Z orach, j udges and commentators have proposed various theories for 
defining and applying the d octrine o f  accommodation . 
For most o f  its history , the accommodation theory has been a favorite of  
moderates . In using the term moderat es , we mean those w h o  believe that,  
while religion plays a vital role i n  American l ife and should not b e  b u rdened 
by excessive governmental intrusion,  the establishment clause must be en­
forced vigi lantly to protect b ot h  religious and polit ical l ibert ies . Recently , 
however,  some commentators have argued that the doctrine should b e  ex­
panded beyond its traditionally narrow scope.15 According to such arguments , 
almost any governmental act i o n  taken to accommodate religious i nterests 
would pass muster under the establishment clause . As at least one scholar 
acknowledges , accommodation i n  this l ight would mean a weakening of both 
religion clauses .16 Such an approach , we would argu e ,  might increase the 
accommodation of  mainstream religi o n s ,  but could compromise the rights 
of minority religions and add dramatically to the government ' s  i nvolvement 
in religious affairs. 
We believe that nei ther the history o f  the religion clauses nor the case law 
that has developed around these clauses supports this posit ion . When prop-
14. In Illinois ex rei. rvlcCollum v. Board of Educ., 3 3 3  U.S. 203 (1948), the Court 
invalidated an Illinois school district's policy of allowing religious instructors to conduct classes 
during the school day on public school grounds. Although the school district did not pay the 
teachers, Justice Black, writing for a majority that included Justice Douglas, stated that: 
[N]ot only are rhe State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the 
dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an 
invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through 
use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of 
Church and State. 
!d. at 212. 
Justices Black, Jackson and Frankfurter, dissenting separately in Zorach, argued that there 
was no meaningful distinction between the programs involved in the two cases. Justice Jackson 
was especially outraged by the seeming contradictions between lv!cCol!um and Zorach. He 
stated: 
The dist inct ion attempted betvveen [McCollum] and this [case] is trivial, almost to 
the point of cynicism, magnifying its nonessential details and disparaging compulsion 
which wa:; the underiying reason for invalidity. A reading of the Court's opinion 
in that case: along with its opinion in this case will show such difference of overtones 
and undenonc.:s as to make clear that the lY!cCo!lum case has passed like a storm 
in a teacup. The wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church and 
State has become even more warped and twisted than I expected. Today's judgment 
wili be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial processes than 
to students of constitutional law. 
3�3 U.S. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
iS. See no£cs 96-l 03 and accornpanying text. 
16. See injn2 note 101 and accornpanying te:·a. 
j 
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erly applied, the accommodation doctrine is a helpful analytical tool that 
resolves much of the tension between the two clauses. By steering a middle 
course between overly strict application of either the establishment or the 
free exercise clause, accommodation theory plays an essential role in the 
continued vitality of both. The concept of accommodation must itself be 
circumscribed carefully, however, or it will lose the quality of moderation 
that is its strength. 
Accommodation, therefore, demands a careful balance between anti-es­
tablishment and free exercise priP..ciples. To allow accommodation to under­
mine the notion of separation of church and state would be to abandon a 
fundamental aspect of the non-establishment mandate. At the other extreme, 
voluntary accommodation by government generally focuses only on the most 
populous and visible religious groups. Religious minorities that currently are 
protected by the free exercise clause most likely would be overlooked if their 
rights were entrusted to the legislatures of state or federal governments. If 
accommodation is allowed to expand into the area protected by the free 
exercise clause, the rights of small minority groups will be prey to the 
"tyranny of the majority." Pushed to either extreme, accommodation would 
undermine core principles of the religion clauses. 
To avoid the dangers of an overly expansive definition of accommodation, 
we propose that accommodation be limited to those situations in which the 
danger of establishment is remote. Further, like the free exercise mandate, 
the accommodation doctrine should be applied where there is a need to 
relieve a burden on religious conduct which is imposed by government. But 
accommodation must not be confused with free exercise; not all burdens on 
religion entitle a religious believer to constitutionally compelled relief. Ac­
commodation should be reserved for religious practices that do not mandate 
free exercise relief. When a compelling state interest justifies a burden on 
religious exercise, or where the infringement is so incidental and remote that 
an exemption is outweighed by the need for uniformity, accommodation is 
appropriate. 
In analyzing a challenged governmental ac tion , a court should determine 
first whether the action removes a burden on reiigion that has been imposed 
by government rather than by social, economic, or other non-governmentai 
forces. If so, the accommodation does not violate the establishment clause. 
Second, a court should determine whether the governmentally-imposed bur­
den would entitle the plaintiff to relief under the free exercise clause. If so, 
the removal of the burden is in reality an interpretation of the scope and 
requirements of the free exercise clause, rather than a truly voluntary ac­
commodation. By contrast, if the burden does not rise to the level of a 
violation of free exercise rights, then the removal of the burden is a gem1ine 
accommodation. 
Our proposed test, then, involves the identification of tvvo basic compo­
nents: 
(1) a governme;l.tally-imposed burden on religious exercise, which 
(2) does not entitle the belie\:er to consriturionaHy-cornpelled relief. 
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This test preserves intact the non-establishment and free exercise guarantees , 
and provides for a significant area o f  governmental accom m odation o f  
religion. Although n o  single standard can anticipate the m any potential 
situations that arise in the course of constitutional litigatio n ,  we are persuaded 
that this proposal strikes a usefu l  b a lance b etween the two clauses . 
I I .  ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RELIGION 
CLAUSES 
As drafted in 1791, both the establishment and free exercise clauses were 
designed to have a narrow scop e .  The dramatic expansion of the federal 
government , and the application of the religion clauses to the states through 
incorporation by the fourteenth amendment, have combined t o  extend the 
reach of the clauses into areas not contemplated by the Drafters or  by the 
rat ifying state s .  
A .  The Original Application of the Religion Clauses17 
Recent scholarship has disclosed that the congressional debates on the 
wording of the religion clauses were not directed toward complete separation 
of religion and government . Rather ,  the clauses were designed to l imit the 
power o f  the federal government (rather than the state governments) to 
declare a particular faith the official religion o f  the United States . The 
Framers wanted to insure that government would not enforce the dogma of 
an officially-endorsed religion, thereby encroaching on the freedom o f  dis­
senters to hold and practice their own beliefs . 18 This  intent is  i l lustrated by 
a proposed amendment submitted by James Madison,  which read : "The civil 
rights of  none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or  worshi p ,  
nor shall any national religion be established , n o r  shall the full a n d  equal 
rights of conscience be in any manner , or on any pretext, i n fringed. " 19 
17. Jefferson Powel l ,  in a bri lliant examinatio n  of the validity o f  using t he " o ri g i n al intent" 
of the Framers as a guide to constitutio nal interpretati o n ,  stated that the intent of the Framers 
"was that the Constitution,  like any other legal document, would be interpreted in accord w i t h  
its express language . "  Powell, The Original Understanding o f  Original Intent, 9 8  HARV. L. 
REv. 885, 903 (1985). In this l ight, the meaning o f  the words used in the d ocument, rather 
than the content of debates surrounding adoption of a particular provisi o n ,  would be the 
primary guide to constitutional i nterpretatio n ,  together with "the usual judicial p r ocess o f  case­
by-case interpretation . ''  !d. at 904. 
Professor Powell's h istorical i nvestigatio n  calls i nto questio n  the view that constitutional  cases 
should be decided by reference to the "original i ntent" of the Framer s .  According to Powell, 
the use of " original intent" to decide cases i nvolving constiwtional provis io ns may violate to 
some extent the very intent at the d rafting of the Constitut i o n . 
18. The pathbreaking legal histOry of Mark DeWolfe H owe revealed that t he protectio n  of 
religious organizations from governmentally-imposed orthodoxy, as well  as the protection of 
government from the encroachments of established religio n ,  were prime factors in the move to 
draft and enact the religion clauses . M. H owE, supra note 2, at l -3 2 .  See also infra note 95. 
19. Wallace v. hffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (Reh nquist , J., dissenting) (citing l A�� .. \LS 
OF Co:--:GRESS at 434). 
. ;Jl 
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Madison explained the meaning o f  the proposal as providing "that Congress 
should not establish a religi o n ,  and enforce the legal observation of it by 
Jaw .  "20 State representatives did not wish to "abolish religion altogether , "  
but instead wanted to preclude the imposition o f  a federal religion o n  the 
states . 21 
The wording eventually adopted makes clear the exclusively federal appli­
cation of the religion clauses . "Congress " alone is prohibited from estab­
lishing a religion and interfering with the free exercise of religion . The history 
of state-established religions , not addressed in the amendmen t ,  as well as 
the plain language of the amendment , make it apparent that the constraints 
imposed by the clauses applied only to the federal government . State actions 
were in n o  way affected by the first amendmen t .  
Religious establishments in the states were common until the early nine­
teenth century.  Massachusetts , Connecticut and M aryland , to name but three 
of the original thirteen stat e s ,  legislated varying degrees of governmental 
support for particular religious denominations.  22 South Carolina established 
"the Christian Protestant religion," without preferring one denomination 
over another . 33 Significantly , in a few cases these state establishments con­
tinued well into the nineteenth century. For example,  M assachusetts ' estab­
lishment of the Congregational Church endured until 1833.24 
20. fd. at 95 lCiting i /--,.N:--;.\LS OF CONGHSS at 730). 
21. fd. (citing 1 ANNALS Of CONGRESS at 729). 
22. As adopted in 1730, Article lil of the Massachusetts Constitution provided: 
As the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government 
essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality ... the legislature shall ... 
require , the severa. l towr1s, p2rish<cs, pr.:cinct:;, and other bodies-politic or religious 
societies to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the 
public worship of God and for the support and maintenance of Protestant teachers 
of piety, religion, and morality, in all cases where such provision shall not be made 
voluntarily. 
5 W. SwiNDLER, SouRCES . .:..ND DocuMENTS OF THE U.S. CoNSTITUTIONs 93 ( 1975) [hereinafter 
SOURCES AND DocUMENTS). 
Connecticut, which delayed adopting a fo rma l constitution well into the nineteenth century, 
preferred instead to retain its 1662 charter, which provided for a religious as well as civil 
government of the colony. 2 SouRCES AND DocuMENTS at 134. The Constitution of 1818, the 
first formal state constitution, disestablished the Co>1gregational Church, providing that "No 
preference shall be given by ia\\' to any Christian sect or mode of \vorship." Art. [, § 4, 
reprinted in id. at 145. 
Article 33 of the Maryland Constitution of 1776 p:uvided that "the Legislature may, in their 
discretion, lay a general C'.nd �qual tax, for the support of the Christian religion . . . . " 4 SouRCES 
AND Docc.nENTS 8.t ".7-1. The Comtitution was amended in 18!0 by Article 13, which stated 
that ''it shall net be lavvful for the gr:rreral assernbly of this State to iay an equal and ger�eral 
tax, or any other " '-'; , on the people of this Stat,�, for the support of anv religion." !d. <tt 387. 
23. Article 38 of the Souti< Caroiina Constitution of 1778 provided: "The Christ ian Prot­
estant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby comtituted and declared to be, the established 
religion of this State." 3 SouRCES AND Doc:UME:>'Ts at 474. This article was repealed implicitly 
by Anicle 8 of the 1790 Constitutio!1, which dec!arerl that free exercise would be protected 
"\vithout dlscrirnination or pr,:fe�·e�ce." Id. at -tSU. 
2.:L The disestablishn1cnt rr�ovcn1t.:n: in IV\asso.chusetts was led, surprisingly· enough, by 
3 24 DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [V o 1 .  3 7 : 3 1 7  
The desire o f  the states that ratified the Constitution was not that all 
government be separated forcibly fro m  all religio n ,  but  that the federal 
govern_ment be expressly confined in the exercise of its power.  Although 
Madison and several other Framers argued that the C onstitution created a 
federal g overnment of such limited powers that no additional p rotection for 
religious l iberty was neces s ary , by 1789 five o f  the eleven colonies that had 
ratified the Constitution insisted that explicit protection for civi l l iberties 
should be appended t o  the original text Y I ndeed, Rhode Is lan d  and North 
C arolina conditioned their ratification o n  the inclusion of a Bill  o f  Rights . 25 
conservative m embers of the establ ished C ongregational Church .  By the early n inetee n t h  century,  
notions o f  original  sin and predestination ,  so central  to pre-Revolutionary Congregational ism , 
seemed backward-look i n g  to educated mercantile Bostonians . These p rosperous city-dwellers 
were attracted b y  the Enl ightenment emphasis on natural morality a
"
nct reason , and rej ected the 
harsh theology of earlier rel igious leaders . The liberals of eastern M assachusetts , seeking to 
escape the strictures o f  orthodoxy, evolved a U nitarian theology, based o n  orderly "sel f-evident 
truths" of the Trinity . See generally S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE A:>fERICAN 
PEOPLE 3 90-94 ( 1 972) (providing historical s urvey of emergence of U nitarian l i beralism ) .  
T h e  split between t h i s  l iberal  faction and the adherents o f  orthodoxy became o p e n  and bitter 
soon after the t u r n  o f  the cent u ry . By 1 820, the schism was final-Harvard was openly Unitar ian,  
and conservatives i n  Dedham were outraged when the majority o f  the parish cal led a l i beral 
U nitarian their  mi nister . I n  the resulting lawsui t ,  Baker v .  Fales , 1 6  :vlass .  488 ( 1 83 0 ) ,  the 
Massachusetts Supreme J u dicial  Court held t hat Article III  o f  the 1 7 80 stme constitution , which 
taxed all landowners not members o f  any other church to support the C o ngreg a t i onal C h ur c h ,  
entitled all taxpayers w h o  contr ibuted t o  t h e  support o f  t h e  parish to vote i n  t h e  elect ion o f  
the mi n ister .  Chief J ustice Parker , :iimse!f a Unitarian, wrote for t he court , stati ng that  the  
decision w a s  not one o f  theology , but rat her of property r igh ts ,  s ince t h ose taxed were t hereby 
privi leged to vote. 1 6  Mass . at 502-03 . See generally M. HowE, supra n o t e  2 at 1 2-32 . 
.<\ngry conservat ives quickly j o i ned with Baptists ,  Presbyterians, Methodists , and other relig­
ious m i norities i n  cal l i ng for disestabl i shment .  Art i cle lll was am end ed i n  i 833 to rec ogn i ze 
si mply that " t he public worship of God , and i nst ruction s i n  piety,  rc:l igi o n ,  anct mo ral ity , 
prornot.:: the h.appin�ss and prosperity of a people, and the security o f  a rcpubl i l:an guvernn1cnt . "  
5 Soc;RCES & Doc u�.iENTS at 1 1 3 .  
25 . Wa l lace v .  Ja ffree, 472 U . S .  3 8 , 93 { 1 985) ( Rehnquist , J . ,  dissent ing) (c it i ng 3 j _  ELLIOTT, 
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 ( 1 39 1 ) ) .  I n  his dissent in Wa/!uce, J ustice Rehnqu i s t  
arg ues that  James Madis o n ,  rather t han Thomas Jefferson , may be a more appropriate source 
for understanding o f  the Framers' perspective,  s ince Jefferson in fact  was o u r  of the count ry 
when the B i l l  of Rights was passed by Co ngress . !d. at 9 2 .  He d iscusses the  h i srory of the  
enactment o f  t h e  religion clnu ses in some detai l ,  co nc l ud i ng t hat t he Framers  n e v a  i n t ended 
to ban school prayer, or  to be neutral between religion and non-religion . 
The C o urt str ikes do\vn the . .:\ l abarn a stac ute because the  S tat e \vished tG ' char­
acterize pray�r as a favored pract ice . ' I t  wo uld come as w uch o f  a shoe!' to  t h ose 
w ho drafted the Bill  of Rights as it will  to a large number of tho ug ht fu l .-\ mericans 
t oday t o  learn t hat the Const i tut ion,  as construed by the maj o r i t y ,  p roh i b i t s  t he 
Alabama Legislature from ' endors i n g '  prayer . George Washington himse lf, at t h e 
request o f  the -,·ery Congress which passed the Bill of Rights , procla i med a day o f  
' public than ksgiving and prayer , to b e  observed by acknowledging l.;< i th grateful  
hearts  the many and signal  favors of Almighty God . '  H istory must j udge w hether 
it was the Fat her o f  his Country i n  1 789,  o r  a maj ority of the Court t oday, which 
has st rayed from the meaning of the Establ ishment Clause . 
Wallace, 472  U . S .  at 1 1 3 ( Rehnquist , J . ,  dissem i ng) . 
:26.  �Va//ctce ) -�-72 U . S .  at 93 (Rehnquist �  J . )  d issenting) (c i t ing J .  ELLIOTT, DEBATES o�.; 
THE fEDER .. u CoNsTJTUTION 334 ( 1 8 9 1 )) .  
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Memories of religious persecution in the " O l d  Worl d , "  as well as the 
widespread resentment provoked before the Revolution by Englan d ' s  attempt 
to send an Anglican bishop to the colonies,  lingered in the minds of state 
legislators . The concerns of the states did not result in a prohibition o f  
establishment a t  home , however , although several states d i d  t a k e  steps t o  
protect the rights o f  religious dissenters Y Thu s ,  a primary fear of many 
state leaders was that the federal government would interfere with state 
establishment s ,  and perhaps even impose a national religion on the individual 
states . 28 
Moreover,  as the Supreme Court recognized recently i n  Marsh v. Charn­
bers, 29 a case i nvolving the constitutionality of state legislative chap lains , the 
adoption o f  the religion clauses did not prompt the Framers to abandon all 
manner o f  religious observance . Indeed , the First Congress elected a chaplain 
to open each legislative session with a prayer , and ' ' the practice of opening 
sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever s ince . " 30 The 
actions of the First Congress reveal that it believed it was bound to protect 
only against a "real threat " o f  religious establishment or infringement of 
religious l iberty . 3 1 The arguably remote possibility of an eventual establish­
ment resulting from the employment of legislative chaplains apparently did 
not present the potential for establishment that the Framers sought to prohibit 
in the religion clauses . 3 2  
27.  See, e.g. PA. CaNST.  of 1 790, Art. IX, § 3 ( 1 790) : 
[ A ] J l  men have a natural and i ndefeas ible right to worship Almighty God according 
to the d ictates of their own consciences ; that no man can of right be compelled t o  
atten d ,  erect, o r  support a n y  place o f  worshi p, or to maintain any m i n i s t r y ,  against 
his consent ;  that n o  human authority can ,  in any case whatever,  control o r  interfere 
with the r ights of conscience; and that n o  preference shall ever be given,  by law, 
to any relig ious establ i shments o r  modes of worshi p .  
8 So uRcEs & Docm.-!ENTS , supra note 2 1 ,  a t  292 . 
2 8 .  This u nderstanding of the appl icabi l i t y  o f  the religion clauses solely as a restraint on 
federal government w a s  unquestio ned throughout the eighteenth and n ineteenth centuries . . �� s 
Chief  Justice M arshall explained in 1833 : 
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the U nited States 
for themselves ,  for their  own government, and not  for the government o f  r.he 
i ndividual stat e s .  Each state estab l ished a const itution for itsel f, and , i n  thm 
constitution, provided such l im itations and restrict ions  on the powers o f  its particular  
government as i t s  judgment dictated.  
Barron v .  The M ayor and City of Baltimore,  32 U . S .  (7  Pet.) 243, 247 ( 1 33 3 ) .  See also Permoli  
v.  Municipal ity No.  I of New Orleans,  44 U . S .  (3 How.)  5 8 9  ( 1 845)  (applying doctr ine of 
Barron to free exercise claim challengi ng city ordinance); see supra note 3 .  
2 9 .  463 U . S .  783 (1983) .  
30 . !d. a t  78 8 .  
3 1 . !d. at 7 9 1 . 
3 2 .  The danger posed by a l egis lat ive chaplaincy, as J ustice Stevens noted in th is  d issent i n  
.Harsh, i s  that chaplains o f  mainstream denomi nations dominate legis lative prayer sess i o n s .  
Prayers m a y  be said by a Catholic priest i n  the Massachusetts Legislature and b y  
a P resbyterian m i n i ster in  the Neb ras k a  Legislature, but I would n o t  expect l O  fi n d  
a J ehovah's Witness o r  a disciple o f  ;\ l ary Baker E d d y  or the R everend ;':l oon 
serving as the official chaplain in  any state l egis lature . 
-t63 U . S .  at 323 (Stevens,  J . )  dissent ing) . 
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B. The Expansion of the Religion Clauses 
It may seem astonishing that the clauses now have such a wide application , 
given the popular understanding at the time of adoption t h at the religion 
clauses applied only to the federal government, and the understanding of 
the Drafters that all religious observance was not prohibited by the clauses . 
Today, the free exercise clause protects schoolchildren from m andatory flag 
salutes in state-run schools ,33 and it prohibits states from requiring oaths of 
office that include references to God Y The establishment clause now pro­
hibits state-sponsored school p rayers or  Bible reading in coerciw settings ,  Js 
and the posting of the Ten Commandments on school wall s .36 
Two maj o r  developments in the legal and political landscape explain this 
expansion of the religion clauses . Firs t ,  the activities of g overnment-at both 
the state and federal levels-h av e  increased dramatically in the twentieth 
century . Second , the " incorporation" o f  the religion clauses through the due 
process clause of the fou rteenth amendment has extended the application of 
the religion clauses to the states . As a result of  these two development s ,  an 
inherent tension between the two clauses has emerged . 
1 .  Increased Go vernmental A ctivity 
The rise o f  the welfare state i n  the mid-twentieth century has generated 
myriad new points of contact between government and individual citizens . 
The advent o f  such programs as Social Security, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children and unemployment insurance all  have contributed to 
increased governmental interaction with i ndividual l ives . Further,  compulsory 
public education, l argely operated by states but encouraged and supported 
financially by the federal government , also involves government in vital 
aspects  o f  t h e  day-to-day lives o f  many Americans Y 
In an era o f  state and federal taxes on everything f r o m  income to fuel  
oi l ,  we often forget that the reach o f  government into o u r  pocketbooks and 
even into our privacy was at  one t ime virtually negligibl e .  For many o f  u s ,  
t h e  reLigious significance o f  photographs on drivers licenses ,38 mandated 
3 3 .  West Virginia State B d .  o f  Educ.  v.  Barnette,  3 1 9  U . S .  624 ( 1 943 ) .  
3 4 .  Torcaso v .  Watkins ,  367 U . S .  488 ( 1 96 1 ) .  
3 5 .  Abington School Dist . v .  Shem p p ,  374 U . S .  203 ( 1 963) ;  Engel v .  V i t a l e ,  3 70 U . S .  42 1 
( 1 962) . 
36 .  Stone v .  Graha m ,  449 U . S .  39 ( 1 980), reh 'g denied, 449 U . S .  ! 1 04 ( 1 98 1 ) . 
3 7 .  For ana·!yses of the  role of compulsory p u b l i c  education in t h e  develop ment o f  t h e  
j urisprudence o f  t h e  religion clauses, s e e  Wallace v .  J a ffree, 472 U . S .  38 ,  80-8 1 ( 1 98 5 )  ( O ' C o n ­
nor,  J . .  concurring); McConnel l ,  supra n o t e  8 ,  at 8- 1 3 .  
3 8 .  See Quaring v .  Peterson ,  728 F.2d 1 1 2 1  ( S t h  Cir .  1 984) (state requi rement o f  phot ograph 
t o  obtai n drive r ' s  l icense v i o l ated plai n t i ff 's  free exercise r ights) ,  aff'd by an equally divided 
Co11rr sub n om . , Jensen v. Quaring,  472 U . S .  478 ( 1 93 5 ) .  
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employment hours on Saturday ,39 or the payment o f  Social S ecurity taxes ,40 
maY seem minimal . Yet to the adherents o f  a variety o f  religious beliefs , 
such governmental regulations invade areas o f  g reat religious significance . 
The free exercise clause ,  when invoked as a support for exemption fro m  an 
otherwise neutral regulation or statute,  may provide an exemption from the 
impact of an ostensibly neutral statute that would force religious b el ievers 
to choose between violating religious beliefs or forfeiting the benefits o f  
participating in governmentally-sponsored programs . 
On the other side o f  the coin , increased governmental activity also runs 
the risk of involving government with religion in a manner that places the 
government ' s  i mprimatur on certain religious practices . M andatory prayer 
in public schools has l ong b een held a governmental endorsement of certain 
religious belie fs or  practices . 41 Some constitutional plaintiffs h ave even argued 
that the public schools h ave b een s o  purged of any vestige o f  religion that 
secular humanism has been enshrined in its place . 42 Although the litigants 
making this argument initially were successful in the district court s ,  appell ate 
tribunals h ave rej ected their claims . 43 Furthermore,  the Supreme Court re­
cently rej ected a similar " secular humanism "  argument in Edwards v .  A quil­
lard. 44 In A qui/lard, the Court held that a Louisiana statute known as the 
Creationism Act , which forbade the teaching o f  evolution in public schools 
unless accompanied by the teaching o f  " creation science, "  violated the 
establishment clause. The Court agreed with the lower court ' s  conclusion 
that the Act did not protect academic freedom but rather discredited ' ' ev­
olution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching ' ' of 
religiously-based t heories , 45 thus conveying a message of o fficial endorsement 
of a particular religious perspective. 
2. Incorporation of the Religion Clauses 
Together with the vastly increased potential for conflicts between religious 
belief and government , the legal world has witnessed a similar expansion of 
39.  See S herbert v.  Verner , 374 U . S .  398 ( 1 963)  (unemployment compensation may n o t  be 
denied to Seventh-Day Adventist w hose religious beliefs prohibit working on Saturday) . 
40. See U ni ted S tates v. Lee, 4 5 5  U . S .  2 5 2  ( 1 982) (Old Order A mish rel ig ious beliefs 
prohibiting payment o r  receipt o f  Social Security taxes outweighed by compelling governmental 
interest in uniform administration o f  Social Security system) .  
4 1 .  See E ngel v .  Vitale,  370 U . S .  42 1 ( 1 962 ) (state may not compose offic ia l  state p rayer 
and require its recitation in public schools) . 
42 . See Mozert v. H aw kins County B d .  of Educ . ,  827 F .2d  1 05 8  (6th Cir .  1 987) ;  Smith v .  
Board o f  School Comm ' rs o f  Mobile County ,  827 F . 2 d  684 ( 1 1 th C i r .  1 987) . 
43 . See, e .g. , Smith v .  Board o f  School Comm ' rs of Mobile County, 655 F .  Supp. 939 
( S . D .  A la . 1 987) (pub lic school textbooks t h a t  omitted reference to signi ficance o f  religio n  i n  
American history violated establishment clause by enshrining religious values o f  secula: hu­
manism ) ,  rev'd, 827 F . 2d 684 ( 1 1 th C i r .  1 98 7 ) ;  :Vlozert v. H awkins County B d .  of Educ. , 647 
F. Sup p .  1 1 94 ( E . D .  Ten n .  1 986) (fundamentalist Christian schoolchildren have free exercise 
right to refrain from reading textbooks that violate their religious beliefs ) ,  rev 'd, 827 F .2d I 058 
(6th C i r .  1 987) . 
44. 107 S. C r .  2573  ( 1 987) . 
-15 . !d. at 2580 (quoting Edwards v .  Aqui ll<t rd ,  765 F . 2d 1 2 5 ! ,  1 2.57 (5th  C i r .  1 985)) . 
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constitutional j urisprudence. For the religion clauses , t h e  w atershed was 
reached in the mid-twentieth century when the clauses were held to be 
" incorporated" into the due p rocess clause o f  the fourteenth amendment . 
The post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution require t hat individual 
states guarantee the equal protection of the law and not abridge individual 
rights to l ife ,  liberty or p roperty without due process o f  law . 46 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the due process clause, which protects ' ' liberty ' '  in 
general , as embod ying m any of the limitations on governm ent contained in 
the Bil l  o f  Right s .  In  two separate cases , Cantwell v .  Connecticuf47 and 
Everson v. Board of Education, 48 the Supreme Court held t h at the free 
exercise and establishment c lauses apply to the states as well as to the federal 
government . 
As a result o f  incorporation , a flo o d  o f  religion clause litigation ensued , 
eventually bringing to l ight an inherent conflict between the c o mm ands of 
the two provisions . The conflict is easily explained , although not easily 
resolved . Generally , the establishm ent clause prohibits the government from 
favoring one religion over another .  If the government grants an exemption 
to a believer under the free exercise clause ,  while requiring all others to obey 
the law, the government effectively prefers the religion of that individual 
over the religion o f  those individuals who adhere to other religious  beliefs ,  
apparently i n  violation o f  t h e  establishment clause. 
The S upreme Court has recognized this tension between the clauses several 
t imes , although thus far it has not set forth a clear resolut ion of the conflict . 49 
Generall y ,  ho wever , the Court and scho l ars have suggested that , while the 
clauses may be logically at odds if read as absolutely prohibiting preferential 
treatment among denominations and infringement of religious exercis e ,  nei­
ther should be given such an absolute reading . As Chief  Justice Burger 
acknowledged in a landmark case dealing with property tax exemptions for 
places used exclusively fo r religious worship , " [t ] he Court has struggled to 
find a neutral course between t h e  two Religion Clauses , both of which are 
46 . Section I o f  t h e  fou rteenth amendment r e a d s :  
Al l  persons born o r  naturalized i n  t h e  U nited S t a t e s ,  a n d  subject t o  t h e  j ur isdict ion 
thereof,  are citizens of the  U nited States  and of t h e  State  wherein t hey res i d e .  No 
State  shal l  make o r  enfo rce any law which shal l  abri dge the pr ivileges or immunit ies  
of citizens of the U nited States ;  nor  shal l  any State deprive a n y  person of life , 
liberty ,  or propert y ,  without  due proces s  of law;  nor deny to any person with in  i t s  
j ur i sdiction t he equal  protect ion o f  the laws .  
U.S .  CoNST.  amend. X I V ,  § I .  
47 . 3 1 0 U . S .  296 ( 1 940) (incorporat i ng free exercise clause) .  
48 . 3 3 0  U . S .  ! ( 1 947) (incorporating establishment clause) .  
49 . See, e .g . ,  Thomas v .  Review Bd . ,  4 5 0  U . S .  7 0 7 ,  7 1 9  ( 1 98 1 )  (acknowledging " tension" 
between cla uses) ; Sherbert v .  Verner ,  374 U . S .  398,  4 1 3 - 1 7  ( 1 963)  (Stewart,  J . , concurr ing)  
( ' ' There are many s i tuat ions where legit imate  claims under  the Free Exercise C lause will r u n  
i n t o  head-on col l i s ion with the Court ' s  i nsens i t ive and s t e r i l e  c o ns t ructi o n  o f  the  Establ ishment  
Cia use . " ) .  
l 
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cast i n  absolute terms , and either o f  which , if expanded to a logical extreme, 
would tend to clash with the other . " 50 
The apparent conflict between the religion clauses has prompted commen­
tators to propose several possible solutions . Professor Kurland of the Uni­
versity of Chi cago articulated a proposed resolution o f  the emerging conflict 
over 20 years ago . He argued that government should be entirely neutral 
with regard to religion . According to Kurland , " religion may not be used 
as a basis for classification for purposes o f  governmental action,  whether 
that action be the con ferring o f  rights or privileges or the imposition o f  
duties or obligations . "5 1  The neutral i ty theory, although certainly a means 
of resolving the discord, h as been criticized as precluding all forms o f  
religious exemptions . A s  Professor Giannella poi nted out , t h e  increase i n  the 
twentieth century of governmental regulations and social welfare programs 
has outmoded Kurland ' s  argument .52 Increased governmental activity i nevi­
tably produces the potential for infr ingement of religious beliefs ,  and the 
neutrality theory would not alleviate the h eightened burden borne by b eliev­
ers . 53  
A second well-known approach would employ differing definitions of 
religion for each clause . Professor Tribe of H arvard University has contended 
that anything " arguably religious" should be protected by the free exercise 
clause ,  and that anything " arguably non-religious" does not violate the 
establishment c lause . 54 Admittedly a means of resolving all conflicts i n  favor 
of the free exercise clause , Tribe maintains that such an approach is necessary 
in a country committed to religious equality and plurali ty . 5 5  However . his 
stance has been criticized as repugnant to the plain language of the clauses . 
The word " rel igion" is used only once i n  the first amendment , prohibiting 
the enactment of " laws respecting an establishment o f  religion,  or prohibiting 
the free exercise t hereof. " 56 Superimposing alternate definitions of the same 
word for the two clauses would be inconsistent with the language of the 
amendmen t .  57 
SO. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 ( 1970). 
51 P. KURLAL'ID , RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 ( 1962). 
52. Giannella, supra note 8, at 1389-90. 
5 3 .  See, e. g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U . S .  3 8 ,  8 2 - 8 3  (1985) (O' Conno r,  J . , concurring) ("I t  
i s  difficult to square any notion of  'complete neutrality' . . . with the mandate of  the Free 
Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a rel i gious observer from an otherwise 
generally appl icable obligat ion. A government that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious 
basis is not neutral toward religion . " ) .  See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U .S .  3 3 3 ,  372  
(White, J . ,  dissenting) (first amendment itself contains religious classification; therefore, absolute 
neutrality is impossible) . 
54 .  L .  TRIBE, supra note 2 ,  § 14-6, at 1 1 3 3 .  
5 5 .  !d. § 14-S, a t  120 1 (free exercise clause should dominate in cases of conflict) . 
5 6 .  U . S .  CoNST . amend. ! .  
5 7 .  In Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F. 2d 1 97 ,  21 i - 1 2  (3d C i r .  1979) (Adams, J , concurring), J udge 
.-\d�nns rejected a dual-definition approach c:s cont rary to both t he language and the hisrory of 
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J ustice O ' Connor recently addressed the tension between the clauses . In a 
concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, a decision invalid ating Alabama' s 
moment of silence statute , she stated that " [t]he solution to the conflict 
between the Religion Clauses lies not in ' neutrality , '  but  rather i n  identifying 
workable l imits to  the government ' s  license to promote t h e  free exercise of 
religion . "  58 At least one Supreme Court Justice, therefore,  indirectly has 
proposed ameliorating much of the tension between t h e  clauses through use 
of the accommodation doctrine . It  is in the " play in the j oints" of the two 
clauses,  to use the l anguage of Chief Justice Burger in Walz v. Tax Com­
mission, 59 that the accommodation theory finds its proper p lace , and that 
much o f  the tension m ay be eliminated . Before examining the boundaries 
o f  the so-called play-in-the-joints approach , we first review the history of 
accommodation.  
I I I .  THE EvoLUTION OF AccOMMODATION THEORY 
As noted earlier , the Supreme Court first articulated the permissible 
accommodation doctrine in the Zorach v. C!auson60 decisi o n .  In Zorach, the 
Supreme Court upheld a released-time program for religious instruction o f  
public schoolchildren , so long a s  t h e  program was n o t  o n  school property.  
the religion clauses: 
Despite the dist inguished scholars who advocate [a dual-definit ion] approach , a 
stronger argument can be made for a unitary definit ion to prevail  for both clauses . 
This  would seem to be the  preferable choice for several reaso n s . First ,  it is virtually 
required by the language of the first  amendment . . . . [Further,  a] l though the 
Constitution has o ften been subj ect to a broad construction , i t  remains a written 
documen t .  I t  is  di fficult t o  just ify a reading o f  the first amendment so as to support 
a dual defi nit ion o f  religi o n ,  nor has our attention been drawn t o  any support for 
such a view in the conventional sources that have been thought  to reveal the 
intention o f  the Framers . 
!d. at 2 1 1 - 1 2  (Adams , J . ,  concurring).  
58. The definition o f  " state act ion" encompasses distinct concepts for p urposes o f  the 
fourteenth and eleventh amendment s .  The eleventh amendment has been construed as embodying 
the doctri ne o f  sovereign immunity;  a state may not be sued without i t s  consent .  See Hans v.  
Louisiana, 1 34 U . S .  I ( 1 890) . The Court , however, has created a distinction between s u i ts 
against a state and suits against a state o fficer. See Ex Parte Youn g ,  209 U . S .  1 23 ( 1 908) .  
Pursuant to the  fourteenth amendment,  a n  individual may bring a n  action against a state 
o fficial provided the relie f  requested is  prospective in nature.  !d. Thus, a n  i ndividual bringing 
suit  i n  this posture is  able to claim " state act i o n "  su fficient to i nvoke the protect ion of the 
fourteenth amendment,  but does not t rigger the p rohibition of the  eleventh amendm e n t .  See 
Tribe, Intergo vernmental Immuni1ies in L iligarion, Taxation and Regulation: Separation of 
Po wers Issues in Contro versies about Federalism, 8 9  HARv . L .  REv 682,  687 n . 2 6  ( 1 97 6 ) .  
However ,  a dual-definit ion o f  a term in the context o f  t h e  religion clauses is  m o r e  problematic .  
First ,  the text o f  the first amen d ment uses  the  term " religion" once,  indicating Congress 
i ntended that a unitary defini t ion should apply to both the establ ishm ent and free exercise 
clauses. See J\llalnak, 592 F . 2 d  at 2 1 1 .  Second,  the two religion clauses were not wri tten a 
century apart , as were the fourteenth and eleven th amendments .  
59 .  3 97 U . S .  at 669 . 
60. 343 U . S .  306 ( 1 9.5 2 ) .  
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Writing for the maj ority , Justice Douglas explained that i nv alidation of the 
arrangement would place the government i n  a position of actual hostility to 
religion . 6' 
Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious 
instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular 
institutions t o  force one or s ome religion on any person . But we fin d  no 
constitutional requirement which makes it  necessary for government to be 
hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the 
effective scope of religious influence . 62 
Such a position,  the Court held, would be antithetical to the principles of 
the Constitutio n . 63 The Court stressed t hat government must be neutral in 
its treatment of  different sects and may not prefer one group over anothe r .  64 
At the same time, government must not be hostile to religion .  E ach religious 
group must be allowed to succeed or fail on its own merits, without gov­
ernmental interference . " We sponsor an attitude on the part of  government 
that shows no p artiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according 
to the zeal of  its adherents and the appeal of its dogm a .  "65 This principle 
of voluntarism , however ,  does not mean that the government must ignore 
all manifestations of religious belief.  As Zorach implied, respecting the 
religious nature of  our people and accommodating religious beliefs are 
fundamental prerequisites of  a pluralistic society . 
Compulsion, according to Zorach, is equally at odds with c onstitutional 
values . Coerced religious exercise would violate basic principles of religious 
liberty . Accommodation of the desire to worship or to take religious i nstruc­
tion differs fundamentally from coercion . In  such a situation , the Court 
stated, ' ' [the government] can close its doors or suspend its operations as 
to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or 
instructio n .  "66 By so doing , government neither endorses nor inhibits religion ,  
but rather follows what t h e  Court c alled " our own prepossessions . " 67 
As Justice B lack argued in his dissent in Zorach ,68 and as a maj ority of 
the Court had stated five years earlier in Everson v. Board of Education, 69 
the Constitution does not require a complete separation of church and state . 
According to the perspective of Zorach, the critical difference between 
sponsorship and accommodation is the compulsory or coercive nature of  the 
government' s  actions . Accommodation stems from the principle of volun­
tarism and does not implicate even indirect compulsion . In Zorach, public 
6 1 .  343 U.S.  at  3 1 4 .  
6 2 .  !d. 
63 . Jd. at 3 1 3 .  
64.  !d. See supra note 49 a n d  accompanying tex t .  
65 . 343 U . S .  at 3 1 3 .  
6 6 .  !d. a t  3 1 4 .  
6 7 .  !d. (citing Ill inois ex rei. McCollum v .  Board of Educ . ,  3 3 3  U . S .  203 , 2 3 8  ( 1 94 8 ) ) .  
68 . !d. at 3 1 8- 1 9  (Blac k ,  J . ,  dissen t i n g ) . 
69.  3 30 U . S .  I ( 1 947) .  
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school grounds were not used for religious i nstruction , nor were students in 
any way required to attend s ectarian classes . Thu s ,  although the p articipating 
public schools certainly showed deference to the religious needs o f  school­
children by releasing them early to go to religious classes , there was no 
actual involvement by the school with the i nstruction itself.  T he schools were 
accommodating rather than promoting religion. 
As Justice J ackson suggested i n  his dissent in Zorach , t h is distinction 
between accommodation and promotion or endorsement m ay seem meta­
physical at times , yet the distinction is a vital one for constitutional analysis 
and furtherance o f  the individual ' s  religious interests . 70 Without such a 
distinction, virtually all governmental actions that take cognizance o f  the 
religious pluralism of the American people would violate the establishment 
claus e .  Pressed to an extreme,  this approach also would invalidate all ex­
emptions granted for religious reasons , u ndermining religious freedo m .  At 
the same time, the precise l imits of permissible accom m o datio n  were not 
defined in Zorach, and the theory remained a minor thread in the fabric of 
constitutional analysis until 1970.  
I n  that year,  t h e  Supreme Court upheld property tax exemptions for 
reiigious as well as other charitable institutions . The Court,  i n  Wa/z v. Tax 
Commission, 71 proclaimed that the granting of tax-exempt status is  not 
sponsorship since the government does not transfer revenue to churches but 
Cimply abstains from demanding that they support the state .72 The Court 
stated : 
The grant of a ta;x exemption is not sponsorship since the government 
does not  transfer part of i ts  revenue to chu rches but simply abstains from 
demanding that the church suppo rt the state.  No one has ever s uggested 
that tax exemption has converted libraries , art gallerie s ,  o r  hospitals into 
arms o f  the state o r  put employees ' on the public payro l l . ' 7 3  
lVIoreover,  Walz refined the concept of accommodatio n .  Recognizing that 
there is  a gray area between the two clauses , Walz stated explicitly that 
" [t] he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means 
co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the free exercise claus e .  "7� 
According to Wa/z, t ax exemptions are accommodations that are analytically 
similar to the released-time program upheld in Zorach . Because state spon­
sorship o f  religious institutions is not inherent in a ta.x exem pt i o n ,  government 
may validiy decide to refrain from requiring churches to support the state . 75 
7 0 .  343 U . S .  at 325 (J ackson ,  J . , d i ssent i ng ) .  
7 1 .  397  U . S .  664 ( 1 970) . 
72.. !d. at 675 . 
7 3 .  !d. 
74.  !d. at 6 7 3 . 
7 5 .  It could be argued that  en forced t axation is potemial ly more p roblematic t ha n  exemption , 
s i nce in t h at case c h u rches in e f fect would be financing governmen t ,  t hereby entangl ing 
government i n  r� l igious a ffairs:  
The haza1ds of churches s u pport ing g o v e r n ment are hardly iess i n  their potent i al 
l 
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Walz was the first decis ion that explicitly distinguished the doctrine of  
accommodat i o n  from free exercise requirements , stating t h at accommodation 
is  not a synonym for free exercise :  
Grants of exemption historically retlect the concern o f  authors o f  consti­
tutions and statutes as to the latent dangers inherent in  the imposition o f  
property t axes; exemption constitutes a reasonable a n d  balanced attempt 
to guard against those dangers . The l imits  o f  permissible state accom m o­
dation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference 
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause . To equate the two would be to 
deny a national heritage with roots in  the Revolution itse lf . "' 
Instead , according to Wa/z, accommodation exists i n  t he " p l ay "  between 
the two religion clauses .77 Voluntary accommodations of  rel igion-actions 
that fall between acts prohibited by the establishment clause and acts required 
by the free exercise clause-are a kind of ' ' benevolent neutral i ty . '  '78 
Ironical ly , Justice Douglas , the aut hor of  Zorach, dissented in Wa/z . 79 
Rather than viewing tax exemptions for religious organizations as a form o f  
governmental abstenti o n ,  Douglas characterized them a s  a subsidy forbidden 
by the non-establishment guarantee . Conceding that the dividing line between 
accommodati o n  and sponsorship may not always be clear , Douglas none­
theless declared that Walz was a clear case,  s ince "in common understanding 
one of  the b est ways t o  ' establ ish'  one or more religions is to subsidize 
them , which a t ax exemption does . " 80 
The Supreme Court hinted i n  a conscientious objector case i n  the  earl y  
197 0 ' s  t hat religious exemptions from military service may b e  another ex­
ample of a permissible accommodation.  sJ However , the  next maj or c ase to 
deal with the concept of accomrnodation involved Title VII of t h e  Civil  
R ights Act and the requirement that employers make " reasonable accom­
m odations " tci employees ' religious need s Y  In Trans World A irlines v .  
Hardison, 83 J ustice Whit e ' s  maj o r i ty opinion held that an employer was not  
required by the statute to incur more than a de minimis cost t o  satisfy the 
t han the hazards o f  govern m e n t  supponing churches ; each relat ionship carries some 
i nvo lv emen t rather t h a n  t he desired i n s u l a t io n  and separat ion .  We cannot  ignore 
t he i nstance> in history when church su pport  of government led to the k i n d  o f  
invo lvement w e  seek to avo i d .  
!d. at 675 ( foot note o m i u e d ) .  
7 6 .  !d. at  673 . 
7 7 .  !d. at 669.  
78.  !d. 
7 9 .  397 U . S .  at 700 (Douglas ,  J . , d i ssent ing) . 
SO. !d. at 70 1 .  
8 1 .  G i l l ette v .  Unit ed States ,  40 1 U . S .  4 3 7 , 46 1 n . 2 3  ( 1 97 1 )  ( n oting that  conscientous obj ect or 
s t a t u s  is nor mai;dated by the free e;;ercisc clause) . 
8 2 .  Under Tit le  V I I .  a private emp loyer may nor d iscri m i na t e  on the basis  of :1n employee ' s  
rel ig ion,  " unless an em ployer demo nst rates t hat  h e  is  u n a b l e  w reasonably acc o m modate to an 
em p loyee ' s  or prospective empl oyee ' s  re l ig ious  observance or practice w i t h o u t  undue hardship  
on t he conduct  o f  t h e  employer ' s  business . "  42 U . S . C .  § 2000e(j) ( 1 982) . 
8 3 .  432 U . S .  63 ( 1 97 7 ) .  
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reasonable accommodation requirement . Strictly speaking,  Hardison was not 
a const itutional cas e ,  given that the challenge was based o n  t he statutory 
language of Title V I I  rather than on constitutional accommodation theory. 
The decision suggests , howeve r ,  that accommodation may not necessarily 
result in preferential treatment for an employee whose religion forbids work 
on Saturdays . 84 Such an arrangement , J ustice White state d ,  would exceed 
the bounds of reasonableness , because , in that case,  it would impose an 
u ndue burden on a private employer . I mplicit in the Hardison holding is the 
notion that,  to pass constitutional scrutiny, any statutory accommodation 
of religion must involve no more than minimal cost for the p rivate accom­
modato r .  
Recently,  several Supreme Court cases have further refined t h e  notion of 
reasonable accommodation of an employee' s  sabbatarian p ractices . In Estate 
of Thornron v. Caldor, Inc.,  85 the Court invalidated a C onnecticut statute 
that required all employers to allow employees to arrange their work week 
in a way that would not conflict with sabbatarian religious beliefs . In  an 
eight-to-one opinio n ,  the Court held that this  requirement was a violation 
of the establishment clause .  Far from being a reasonable accommodation,  
the blanket right to be excused from work , without regard to the hardship 
suffered by the employers or  other employees , was a state-imposed burden 
on private employers to support religious worship .  86 
In A nsonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 87 Chief Justice Rehnquis t ,  
writing for t h e  Court, upheld an employe r ' s  policy that p a i d  personal leave 
for religious observance be limited to three days per year . Because the Court 
determined that it was " reasonable" to structure the leave system t o  provide 
a maximum of three paid religious holidays, the maj ority held that it need 
not inquire whether another leave policy that may h ave accommodated the 
plaintiff' s religious beliefs to a greater extent , m ight also h ave been reason­
abl e .  "By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommo­
dation by the employer is sufficient to meet an accommodation obligation . . . .  
The employer need not further show that each of the employee ' s  [proposed] 
alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship . " 88 
84. M at 84. 
8 5 .  472 U . S .  703 ( 1 98 5 )  
86 .  Irt a t  7 1 0 ( " [U] nyielding weight i ng i n  favor o f  Sabbath observers over a l l  o ther i merests 
contravenes a fundamen t a l  p r i n •: ip le  o f  the Religion Clauses , "  by req u i ring employers and 
fel low emp loyees t o  support observance of Sabbatarian s . ) .  
87 .  1 07 S .  C L  3 6 7  ( 1 986 ) .  
8 8 .  1 07 S .  CL a t  3 7 2 .  J us t ice Marsh al l s uggested i n  h i s  dissent t h a t  t h e  employe r  has a du t y 
to consider an empl oyee ' s prop osal for accomodati o n  where the  confict  is not "com pleteiy 
resolved" by the employer ' s  solut ion.  H e  s tated that i n  Philbrook the conflict had not been 
ful l y  reso lved because the employee was forced lO choose between following his rel igious 
precepts and l o s i n g  wages ,  or violating t h ose precep t s  in  order t o  receive ful l  pay . J us t i ce 
Marshall  s t ated that  t h e  em p l o yer had a duty u nder Tit le  V ! J  to consider further al terna t i ve 
proposals for accommodation i f  t hese s t eps could be t a k e n  w i t hout u n d u e  h a rd sh i p .  !d. at 374-
7 5 .  
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Most recently ,  i n  Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.  A mos, 89 the Court upheld Title V I I ' s  
exemption o f  religious employers from t h e  p rovisions o f  the statute against 
an establishment clause challenge . Justice White ' s  maj ority opinion held that 
the exemption was a valid acconunodation o f  the interests of religious 
institutions . The Court noted that the exemption, which was extended in 
197 1  from covering only religious activities to  apply to all  non-profit  activities 
of religious organizations , removed a significant burden from religious em­
ployers .90 The Court determined that the fact that only religi o u s ,  rather than 
all non-profit  organizations are bene fited b y  the exemption, did not violate 
the establishment clause.  Removal of  a regulatory burden on religious insti­
tutions need not " come packaged with benefits to secular entities " to pass 
constitutional muster as a permissible accommodation . 91 
Apparently ,  the Supreme Court is wary of requiring private employers 
under Title V I I  to adj ust their p ractices to  the religious beliefs of their 
employees . At the same time ,  however , government may v alidly exempt 
religious employers from compliance with Title VII requirements . In areas 
involving sabbatarian or other religious motivations for ceasing work , the 
Court repeatedly has held that the free exercise clause protects the right o f  
individuals to  claim unemployment insurance from the state.92 
I n  the two most recent unemploym ent insurance cases , Chief J ustice 
Rehnquist argued in dissents that the state should not be required to accom­
modate such religious choices, but instead should be allowed to d o  so 
voluntarily. 93  M aintaining that both the establishment and free exercise 
clauses have been read too broadly , he is persuaded that:  " [w] here,  as here , 
a State has enacted a general statute , the purpose and effect o f  which is to 
advance the Stat e ' s  secular goal s ,  the Free Exercise Clause d o es not in my 
view require the State to conform that statute to the dictates of religious 
conscience of any group . " 94 "Conversely ,  governmental assistance which 
does not have the e ffect of ' inducing'  religious belief, but instead merely 
' accommodates'  or implements an independent religious choice does not 
impermissibly involve the government in religious choices and therefore does 
not viol ate the Establishment Clause . . . . " 95 From his viewpoint , the 
primary cause of the tension between the clauses is an erroneously expansive 
reading of  the clauses , rather than an inherent confl ict contained within 
them . Exemptions would be virtually nonexistent under the j u risprudence 
89. 1 07 S. Ct. 2862 ( 1 987) .  
90.  /d. at 286 8 .  
9 1 .  !d. at 2 869.  
92 . See, e.g. , Hobbie v .  Unemp l o yment A p peals Cornm ' n ,  1 07 S .  Ct .  1 046 ( 1 98 7 ) ;  T homas 
v .  R eview B d . ,  450 U . S .  707 ( 1 98 1 ) ; Sherbert v .  V erner, 374 U . S .  398 ( 1 963 ) .  
9 3 .  Hobbie, 1 07 S .  Ct . a t  1 05 2  (Rehnquis t ,  C . J . ,  di ssenting);  Thomas, 450 U . S .  at 723 
(Rehnquist ,  J . ,  dissenting) . 
94.  Thomas, 450 U . S .  at 723 (Rehnquist , J . ,  dissenting) . 
9 5 .  !d. ar 727 . 
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espoused by Chief Justice Rehnquist .96 The establishment clause would be 
reduced to a prohibition only o f  direct inducement o f  belief. Accommoda­
tion, therefore,  would b e  the rule rather than the exception,  and apparent 
conflict b etween the clauses would disappear . 
A number o f  legal scholars,  most notably P rofessor M c Connell o f  the 
University o f  C hicago , h ave proposed a similar approac h .  M cConnell con­
tends that an accommodation of religion that promotes " religious liberty" 
s hould be upheld.  97 Moreover,  he argues that government should be permitted 
to remove socially-imposed b urdens as well as governmentally-imposed bur­
dens,  and proposes a three-step analysis to distinguish between permiss ible 
accommodations and unwarranted benefits . 98 The primary question in ana­
lyzing a challenged accommodation of religion,  according to M c Connel l ,  is 
whether the action accommodates an independently adopted religion,  or 
whether the action induces religious belief in w ays that further state inter­
ests . 99 Seco n d ,  McConnell asks whether the accomm o d ation interferes with 
the religious rights of other s _IC)()  Finally , he  would reject an accom modation 
that preferred one religious sect over another. 1 0 1  Some commentators have 
acknowledged that such an expansion o f  accommodation would s ubstantially 
weaken the free exercise clause as well as the establishment claus e .  They 
96. J ustice Harlan,  dissent ing in Sherbert, argued essen t i a l l y  the  sam e  p o i n t :  
It  h a s  been suggested t h a t  . . s i ngling out  o f  rel igious conduct for special 
treatment may violate the  constitut ional  l i m i tat ions  on state action . . . .  My own 
view, however,  i s  that  a t  least  under the  circumstances o f  t h i s  case i t  would be a 
permissible accommodation of rel igion for the  State ,  i f  i t  chose to do s o ,  to create 
an except ion t o  its eligi b i l ity requirements for persons like appel l a n t . . . .  
. . . . [ H ] owever , I cannot subscribe t o  the  conclus ion t ha t  the  State  i s  const i tu­
tional l y  compelled to carve out a n  except ion t o  i ts  general  rule o f  e l ig ibi l i t y  in the 
present  case.  Those situations i n  which t h e  Consti tut ion may req u i re s pecial  t reat­
ment o n  account of religion are , i n  my view, few and far between . . . .  
374 U . S .  at 422-23 (Har lan ,  J . ,  d issenting) (citat ions o m itted) (emphasis  i n  original ) .  
9 7 .  McC o n n e l l ,  supra note  8 ,  a t  34-35  ( "The essent i a l  d is t inction [for  const i tut ional  analysis]  
is  between permissible  accommodations,  which faci l i tate re l igious l i be r t y ,  a n d  unwarranted 
benefi t s ,  which constrain rel igious choice . " ) .  
9 8 .  McConnel l  states:  
Just as the  government pursues " equal  protec t i o n  values" when it  enacts laws 
p;ohibit ing racial  discri m i nation in private markets ,  so a lso it  pursues " free exercise 
values" when i t  facilitates religious l iberty i n  society at large. The " s t ate acti o n "  
l imitat ion on const i tut ional  rights does not  l ogically i m p l y  a n y  l i m i t  o n  gover n m e n t ' s  
power to extend statutory r i g h t s  u n d e r  its  power to regulate c o mmerce .  
!d. a t  3 2 .  
T h i s  approac h ,  we believe, w o u l d  u n d u l y  weaken t h e  establ ishment c l a u s e .  Y i rtual iy  " [a ] n y  
statute perta in ing w rel igion c a n  b e  viewed a s  a n  ' accommodation'  o f  free exercise r igh t s . "  
Amos, 1 07 S .  C t .  a t  2874 ( O ' Co n nor,  J . ,  concurring) (quoting Wal lace v .  Ja ffree, 4 7 2  U . S .  
3 8 ,  82 ( 1 985)) .  Furt h e r ,  unl ike t h e  equal protection a n al ogy drawn by P r o fessor ivlcCo n n d l ,  
t h e  free exercise clause i s  l i mited di rectly by i ts  companion p rovisi o n ,  t h e  est a b l i s h m ent clause . 
No such l i m i t a t i o n  circumscribes the  advancement of " equal protect ion values . "  
99.  McCon n el l ,  supra note 8 ,  a t  3 5 .  
I 00. Id. a t  3 7 . 
! 0 1 . !d. at 3 9 .  
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argue that only i f  both clauses are curtailed s harply from current levels o f  
enforcement can the government operate e fficientl y .  1 02 
We believe that such an approach goes too far .  The history of the 
enactment of the religion clauses shows a concern for civil  as well  as religious 
liberties . 1 03 Although the clauses must be read with sufficient restraint to 
avoid unnecessary conflict between the two, the spirit of the first amendment 
demands continued vigilance to protect the religious and civil liberties of all 
citizens . 104 It is  this principle of protection of religious and civil  l iberties , 
tempered by a due regard for the conviction of the Framers that they were 
designing a cohesive program for religious liberty , that should i nform our 
interpretation of the t heory of accommodation. 
1 02 .  E. g . ,  Oaks,  supra note 8 ,  at 4 (" [A]ccommodation represents a relaxa t i o n  o f  b o t h  the 
non-establishment a n d  free exercise commands of the  reli g i o n  clause . " ) .  
1 03 .  A s  Mark DeWolfe Howe a n d  others have pointed out,  the Supreme Court jur isprudence 
of the 1 940's and 1 95 0 ' s  inaccurately emphasized the " J e ffersonian" m odel  o f  the rel igion 
clauses,  overlooking completely the substant ia! i n fluence of evangelical  Protestant ism i n  the 
enact ment o f  t he c lauses . M .  H o wE , supra note 2 ,  a t 1 -3 6 ;  Mead supra note 2,  at 1 65-70. 
Cases ,  such as Everson v.  Board o f  Educ . ,  330 U . S .  1 ( 1 947),  which , relying o n  a p hrase first  
used b y  Jefferson ,  held that " [t ] h e  First A mendment has erected a wall  between church and 
state , "  id. at 1 8 ,  stressed that " [ t ]he structure o f  o u r  government has,  for the  preservation of 
civil  l iberty,  rescued t he temporal institutions from religious interference . "  Id. a t  1 5  (quoting 
Watson v.  Jones , 80 U . S .  ( 1 3  Wal l . )  679, 750 ( 1 87 ! )) .  As J ustice Rehnquist pointed out  i n  his 
dissent in Wallace v. J affree, 472 U .S .  3 8 ,  9 1 -99 ( ! 985)  (Reh nquist,  J . ,  dissenting),  exclusive 
reliance on the anti-clerical pol i t ical phi losophies of Thomas J e fferso n ,  or even J ames Madison,  
may be m isplaced. Perhaps because " American P rotestant ism has never developed any ful l ­
blown theoretical just ification f o r  i t s  [advocacy o f  disestabl ishment] , "  S .  MEAD , THE LIVELY 
EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIA:-i'iTY IN A'<IERICA 55-56 ( 1 963),  the rat ional ist  just ificat ion 
fo r disestab l i shment long domi nated Supreme C o u rt analy s i s .  
T h e  recent scholarly a n d  j udicial  focus on the rel igious mot ivat i o n  for disestabl ishment-the 
protection o f  " the garden i n  the wi lderness " -has corrected much o f  the earlier gap i n  historical 
analys i s .  If anyt hi n g ,  the pendulum now has swung too far i n  the other direc t i o n : the Supreme 
Court seems almost u n w i l ling t o  co ncede any rat ional is t  component of the re l ig ion clauses . In 
fact , the rel igi o n  clauses were produced by a temporary un i o n  o f  rational ists  and piet is ts ,  both 
of whom, despi te fundamentally d i fferent reasons for doing so, agre·�d that rel igion i s  a matter 
of i nd ividual conscience, not  properly subject t o  governmental interference o r  support . The 
union was not of long dura t i o n ,  however, primari ly because disestabl ishmt:nt and free exercise 
protection removed the only reason for unificat i o n .  
Thus , while i t  would be a mistake to em phasize t he rat ional is t  element at t he expense o f  the  
evangelical i n fluence, it  is  a lso  incorrect to argue t h at the protection o f  religious l iberty was 
the only m otive for the enactment o f  the c lauses . The rational ists  were profoundly  concerned 
that c ivi l  l iberties be shielded from potential erosion by established religio n .  
1 0-+ . A s  J ustice O ' Conno r  noted recen t l y :  
Even i f  the Founding Fathers d id  not  l ive in a society with t h e  " b road range o f  
benefits [ a n d ]  complex program s "  t hat the Federal Government administers today , 
. t hey constructed a society in which the Const i tut ion placed e:;press l i m i ts upon 
governmental act ions  l imit ing the freedoms o f  th�lt society's  members . The r ise  of  
the welfare s tate  was not t h e  fal l  o f  the Free Exercise Clause.  
Bowen v .  Roy,  ! 06 S. Ct . 2 1 47 ,  2 i 69 ( i 936) (O'Connor,  J . ,  concurring in part and disseming 
i n  part ) .  
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I V .  THE ROLE OF ACCOMMODATION I N  CONSTITUTIONAL J URISPRUDENCE 
Of primary importance in any examination o f  the concept o f  accommo­
dation is the recognition that the zone o f  p ermissible accommod ati on oc­
cupies the area between t h e  two clauses . Accommodatio n  thus touches both 
the estab lishment prohibition and the free exercise guarantee,  without vio­
l ating either . This recognition is a vital one,  in that a valid accommodation, 
while it is not required b y  the free exercise clause, is nonet h eless related to 
free exercise interests . Former Chief Justice B u rger , a fter pointing out in 
Walz that accommodation is  not limited by free exercise , 1 05 stopped short 
of providing any guidelines for determining t h e  relationship b etween accom­
modation and free exercise . 
I n  an insight ful  concurrence in Wallace v. Jajjree, 106 J u stice O ' Connor 
stated that the conflict b etween the religion clauses should b e  mediated 
through a properly defined accommodation doctrine.  S h e  further pointed 
out that the establishment and free exercise clauses are addressed to govern­
mental action,  rather than social or other non-governmental forces . Given 
this concern with state action,  government validly may implement free 
exercise values by removing a governmental ly-imposed b u rden on religion.  
A statute exempting religious individuals from an otherwise burdensome 
regulation ,  therefore , should be recognized as ful filling the spirit of the free 
exercise clause and should not be held to abridge the establishment clause. 107 
The solution to the confl ict  between the religion clau ses l ies  not  i n  " neu­
trality , "  but rather in  identifying workable l imits  to the Governme n t ' s  
license to promote the free exercise o f  religion.  T h e  text o f  t he free exercise 
clause speaks of laws that prohibit the free exercise of rel igion . O n  its 
face, the clause i s  d irected at government interference with free exercise .  
Given that concern , one can plausibly assert that  government p u rsues free 
exercise clause values when it l i fts  a governmentally-imposed burden on 
the free exercise o f  relig i o n .  If  a statute falls within this  category, then 
the standard establishment clause test  should be modified accordingly . 108 
Herein lies Justice O ' Conno r ' s  resolution of the tension b etween the two 
clauses : If government voluntarily removes a b urden it  has placed on religion,  
that removal does not automatically violate the establish ment clause .  Thus , 
some accommodations are constitutional,  but only those that remove gov­
ernmentally-imposed burdens on religion.  
This approach is  consistent with earlier Supreme Court  statements about 
accommodation.  For example,  in Wa/z the Court stressed that the state tax 
exemption of religious properties was not an unconstitutional establishment 
of religi o n ,  because the exemption removed a governmentally-imposed bur­
den on religious institutions, rather than conferring a b enefit.  " We cannot 
1 05 .  Wa/z v. Tax Comm 'n ,  397 U . S .  664 , 67 3 ( 1 97 0 ) .  
1 06 .  472 U . S .  3 8 ,  67 ( 1 985)  (O ' Connor,  J . ,  concurring).  
!07.  !d. See also supra note 90, for an analysis  o f  McConnell ' s  cr i t ique o f  t h i s  ! i mitation . 
1 08 .  472 U . S .  at 8 4 .  
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read New Yor k ' s  statute as attempting t o  establish religion ; it i s  s imply 
sparing the exercise of religion from the burden o f  property taxat i o n  levied 
on private profit institutions . ' ' 109 
This accommodation analysis applies to the removal o f  burdens on religious 
exercise when the free exercise clause does not mandate granting an exception 
or invalidating a regulation .  Thus , the doctrine of accommodation permits 
affirmative governmental actions to lessen a burden on a religious interest . 
The next question must b e  what comprises such a religious i nterest . I n  
exploring t h e  contours of t h e  doctrine , we propose that a burden o n  a 
religious interest exists when government h as required compliance with a 
regulation which o ffends the religious sensibilities of individuals or i nstitu­
tions , but which would not t rigger a constitutional right to relief under the 
free exercise clause . I f  there is a compelling state interest in the regulatio n ,  
o r  i f  the religious i nterest is so remote a n d  tangential that the action does 
not rise to the l evel o f  an i n fringement,  the free exercise clause does not 
mandate that government accommodate the belief. When gov ernment vol­
untarily chooses to alter its requirements to comport with such a religious 
interest , however, the accommodation would not violate the establishment 
clause.  This broad definition of permissible accommodation is  somewhat 
complex, but two examples may clarify its application . 
An il lustration o f  a religious interest in an exemption , as opposed to a 
free exercise right to exemption,  is found in the draft cases involving con­
scientious objection to war . As the Supreme Court noted in Gillette v. United 
States, it is generally accepted that the Constitution does not mandate 
exemption from military service for conscientious obj ectors , 1 10 because one 
of the most compelling state interests i s  that o f  government i n  p rotecting its 
citizens and borders through military conscription.  Although interpreting a 
statute rather than applying a fuil constitutional analysis ,  the c aselaw implies 
that such an important interest in national security would outweigh individual 
religious obj ections to war. ' "  Thu s ,  there would be no free exercise right to 
exemption from the draft ,  because a compelling state interest j ustifies con­
scription . As Professor Giannelia noted , the compelling state i nterest argu­
ment is bolstered further by the fact that a proposal to include an exemption 
for conscientious obj ectors was not adopted by the drafters o f  the first 
amendment . 1 12 
Yet it is clear that some religious groups sincerely oppose all use o f  force , 
even i n  self-defens e .  The religious interests o f  p acifists unquestionably are 
burdened by the requirement that they participate in armed conflict . The 
fact that the state has a compell ing interest in its defense does not lessen 
1 09 .  397 U . S . at 67 3 .  
1 1 0 .  40 1 U . S .  'm, Ll6 l  n . 2 3  ( 1 97 ! ) .  
I l l .  See, e. g. , Welsh v .  U nited States. 398 U . S .  3 3 3 ,  3 1 0  ( 1 970) (White, J . ,  d issenti ng) 
(" [T] his Court has mor� than once stated its unwil l i ngness to construe the F i rst Amendment , 
standing alone, as requiring d m ft exe!l1pt ions for religious believer s . " ) .  
1 1 2 .  Giannei !a ,  supra not ·� 3 ,  at I L\ l l - 1 2 . 
1 
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the heavy b urden borne by groups l ike the Quakers , whose commitment to 
pacifism predates by more than a century the Revolution t hat created our 
country . 1 1 3  An accommodation of such a clear religious i nterest would not 
violate the establishment c lause . 1 1 4 
A further example o f  voluntary accommodation in an area o f  compelling 
state i nterests is presented by the late Judge Leventhal ' s  t houghtfu l  concur­
rence in A nderson v. Laird. 1 1 5 I n  that case,  the District o f  Columbia Circuit 
Court struck down regulations at Army, Navy and Air Force academies that 
required cadets to attend chapel on a weekly b asis and prohibited them from 
changing their religious a ffiliation without permissio n . Concurring in the 
j udgment , Judge Leventhal stressed that coerced worship undoubtedly vio­
l ated basic constitutional principles,  but, if the academies had made chapel 
services available without compelling attendance, their actions would not 
h ave transgressed the establishment c lause . Judge Leventhal stated : 
[ I ] t  is important to begin with the  proposi tion which to me at least seems 
clear, that the Establish ment Clause does not p rohibit the Academies fro m  
p roviding property, facil i t ies ,  a n d  personnel in order to permit chapel and 
church attendance by cadets on a voluntary basi s .  I n  this voluntary contex t ,  
t h e  scope of the Estabushment Ciause i s  affected by t h e  special position 
o f  the military and needs o f  i ts  o ften isolated personnel , and such expen­
ditures do not constit ute an " excessive entanglement" with religi o n . 1 1 6 
Despite the fact that provision o f  chapels and chaplains involves an expen­
diture of governmental funds,  the financial support of religion would not 
abridge the establishment clause because the academies in  that event would 
be recognizing the special needs of military personnel , who o ften are isolated 
or  restricted in their mo vements . l n  such situations , the availability o f  
religious worship o r  spiritual counseling would accom modate beliefs t hat 
otherwise would be burdened by the exigencies of  military servic e .  1 1 7 
1 1 3 .  Will iam Pen n ,  in his  essay ' ' For of Light Came Sight , "  o ffered t h e  foll o w i ng explana t i o n  
o f  Quaker pacificism : 
Not fighting,  but su ffering is a n other test i mony peculiar t o  [Qua k e rs] . They 
affirm that Christ ianity teacheth people to beat their swords i n to plough-shares,  
and' their  spears into p r u n i ng hooks, a n d  to Jean: war no more, t h at s o  the w o l f  
m a y  l ie  down w i t h  the iamb a n d  t h e  l ion with t h e  c a l f ,  and n o t h i ng that des troys 
be entertained in the hearts of people . . . .  
Reprinted in THE QuAKER R EADER 106,  1 09 ( J .  West e d .  1 962) . See also E .  RussELL, THE 
HISTORY OF QuAKERISM 46- 5 3 ,  1 65 - 1 82 ( 1 942) . 
1 1 4 .  J ustice W hi t e  seems to agree w i t h  t h i s  analysis of the conscientious objector c a s e s .  I n  
a dissent i n  Welsh , he arg ued that  Congress should b e  allowed t o  deter m i r:e whether i t  w o u l d  
voluntarily exempt religious paci fisi s .  S u c h  a n  excep t i o n ,  he maintai ned , wou l d  nor violate t h e  
establ ishment clause.  398 U . S .  at 370-7 1 .  
! ! 5 .  466 F . 2d 283 ( D . C .  C i r .  1 972),  cen. der1ied sub n om . ,  Laird \' . Ande-rso n ,  409 U . S .  
1 076 ( 1 97 2 ) .  
1 1 6 .  !d. at 298 ( L eventhal , .J . ,  c o n c u r r i n g ) .  F o r  a t h o u g h t ful  analysis o f  the  c o n s t i t u t i onality 
of t he military chapiaincy as i t  is  current l y  st ructured , see Note,  !vfi!itwy J"viirrors on rhe Wall: 
l'ionestablishmeni and r he Mifirary Chaplaincy, 9.5 Y AI.E L .  J .  1 2 1 0 ( 1 98 6 ) .  
1 1 7 .  !d. 
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The recent decision Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Ch urch 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v .  A mos1 1 8  made this approach even 
clearer .  That case involved an establ ishment clause challenge to the con­
gressional exemption of  religious employers from Title V I I ' s  equal employ­
ment o p p o rt u ni t y  r e q u i r e m ent s .  The C o u r t  u p h e l d  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  
accommodation of  the interests of  religious institutions . Rej ecting t h e  ar­
aument that the exemption violates the establishment clause because it applies 0 
only to the  religious activities of religious employers , rather than to a b road 
class of secular and religious non-profit activity, the Court heid that " [w] here, 
as here, government acts with the proper purpose of l ifting a regu lation that 
burdens the exercise o f  religion, we see no reason to require that the 
exemption come packaged with bene fits to secular entities . " 1 1 9 Thus , when 
aovernment removes a regulato ry-rather than a social or  other non-govern-o 
mentally-imposed-burden on a religious interes t ,  even if the free exercise 
clause would not require an exempti o n ,  such a removal is  a valid accom­
modatio n ,  and the establishment clause does not invalidate the action.  
Religious employers would not have a free exercise right to exempti o n ,  given 
the compelling interests served by Title V I I .  On the other hand , there c an 
be no doubt that imposition o f  Title V I I  requirements on religious employers 
would impose a burden on their religious beliefs and practices . In such a 
situation , the establishment clause permits accommodation,  although the free 
exercise clause does not mandate an exemption.  
A third example of  this first prong o f  our proposed test  is found i n  United 
States v. Lee. 1 20 In that case, the Court found that the federal government ' s  
interest i n  uniform and predictable col lection o f  S ocial Security t axes Otlt­
weighed an Amish employe r ' s  religious objection to payment of the taxes . 1 2 1 
Although not expl icitly addressed by the Court,  it is likely that a congres­
sionally-enacted exemption for employers l ike Lee would be constitutional , 
given that there i s  a burden imposed o n  the Amish employer by the man­
datory tax payment . The free exercise clause,  while certainly re levant t o  the 
burden, does not provide a means of relief, because of the compelling interest 
in uniformity . Congress cou l d ,  however , decide on its own that the value of 
accommodating religious dissenters outweighs its own interest in uniform 
collection . 
The second broad category of permissible accommodations is i llustrated 
by the S upreme Court ' s  decision in Bmven v .  Roy. 1 22 In Bo wen, the Supreme 
Court upheld the regulation that a dependent recipient of Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children must have a social security number . The plaintiff, 
a Native American , claimed that his beliefs would b e  violated if his ds.ughter ' s  
social security number was used b y  the government i n  i t s  processing of 
1 1 8 .  1 07 S .  C t .  2 8 6 2  ( 1 987 ) .  
1 1 9 .  !d. a t  2869. 
1 20 .  455  U . S .  252 ( l 982) .  
1 2 1 .  455 U . S .  at 258-59 .  
1 22 .  1 06 S .  C t .  2 1 47 ( 1 986) .  
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benefits .  The plaintiff believed that the use of the s o cial  security number 
might impair his  daughter ' s  spiri t .  The Court recognized that the plaintiff' s 
beliefs were sincere and could conceivably be affected a dversely by the 
regulation . However,  it concluded that the free exercise clause did not require 
an exemption,  because the internal governmental procedures affected the 
plaintiff' s religious beliefs only marginally .  According to R oy, a plaintiff 
may not invoke the p rotection of the free exercise clause i f  governmental 
activity is exclusively internal,  only i ncidentally affecting the interests of 
individual citizen s .  In other words , a religious individual d o es not have a 
free exercise right to restructure i nternal governmental procedures to conform 
with his or her religious beliefs .  The infringement was de min imis, and 
mandatory adj ustment o f  auditing mechanisms could well  have imposed 
substantial costs . 1 23 
Thu s ,  despite the plai ntiff' s genuine religious interes t ,  h e  could not demand 
an exemption from the regulati on, since to do so would require the govern­
ment to restructure its own auditing mechanisms . The incidental effect of 
the requirement was a p otential burden on a religious i nterest . B ecause the 
government ' s  use o f  a social security number already in  its p ossession a ffected 
religious exercise only t angentiall y ,  however ,  the burden was held to be only 
i ncidental and could be j u stified by the state 's  substantial interest i n  pre­
venting fraud and administering benefits . 1 24 As in the draft and Title V I I  
cases , voluntary exception from t h e  social security number requirement to 
accommodate the plaintiff' s beliefs would not violate the n on-establishment 
mandate,  s ince the burden o n  the belief w as imposed by the regulation . 
Most recently ,  the holding o f  Bo wen v. Roy was extended t o  apply to a 
claim that proposed governmental development o f  public lands would destroy 
the practice o f  the site-specific religion o f  several local N ative A merican 
tribes . In Lyng v. North west Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 1 25 
1 2 3 .  !d. at 2 ! 5 5 -56.  
1 24 .  The case was a confusing one procedural ly .  The p la int iff ,  who argued original ly that  
providing a social security number for h i s  daughter would violate h i s  rel igious bel iefs ,  changed 
his posit ion when i t  was revealed at  the final  day o f  trial that the government already possessed 
a social security number for the  daughte r ,  and had been using i t  in processing benefits  for the 
plainti ff.  A fter this revelation , the plaint iff  changed his complaint t o  reflect a bel ief that the 
governmen t ' s  use of an already existi ng social  security number would violate h i s  bel iefs .  Just ice 
S tevens believed that the case had been mooted b y  the discovery o f  the number's  existence, but  
that ,  even if  i t  was  not m o o t ,  the case was not r ipe,  given that the trial  had been based on the 
erroneous bel ief  that  no social security number had yet been obtained for  the p l a i n t i ff's  daugh ter . 
1 06 S .  Ct . at 2 1 63-64 ( Steven s ,  J . ,  concurring).  
J ustice O ' Connor ,  j oi ned b y  Just ices M arshal l and B rennan, concurr ing i n  part and d issenting 
in  part , m<ti nta ined t hat there is a crucial  d i fference between prohibiting government from using 
i n  a neut ral and impartial way i n formation already i n  i ts  possessi o n ,  a n d  requir ing a potential  
recipient to supply a social securi ty  number prior to receiving ben e fi t s .  In the latter s i tuation 
the t raditional compell ing state interest- least restrict ive means test  should be tr iggered, because 
i n  that situatio n  government would be condit ioning receipt o f  a benefit u pon an i n fringement 
o f  free exercise rights . 1 06 S.  Ct. at 2 1 65 ( O ' Connor ,  J . ,  concurring in pan and dissent ing in 
part ) .  
! 2 5 .  108 S.  C t .  1 3 1 9  ( 1 988) . 
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Justice O ' Connor, writing for a 5-3  m aj o rity , held that the government need 
not demonstrate a compelling interest in the construction of a logging road,  
despite the fact that "the loggi ng and road-building proj ects at issue i n  this 
case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious prac­
tices . " 12
6 The m aj ority rej ected the argument o f  the dissent that federal land­
use decisions , unlike the internal recordkeeping processes at issue i n  Roy, 
have "substantial external effects , "  1 27 and have the potential "to d estroy an 
entire religion . "  1
28 The Court did stress ,  however , that a voluntary decision 
to forego construction in the area sacred to the l ocal tribes would be a v alid 
accommodation o f  what are indisputably vital religious interests:  " Nothing 
in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the 
religious needs of any citizen. The Government ' s  rights to  the use  o f  its own 
land, for example,  need not and should not discourage it from accommo­
dating religious practices like those engaged in by the I ndian respondents . "  129 
Lyng is reminiscent o f  Braunfeld v. Bro wn. 1 30 In that cas e ,  the Supreme 
Court denied an orthodox Jewish merchant 's  claim that Sunday closing laws 
had violated his free exercise rights . The p l aintiff maintained that the Sunday 
closing law put him at an unfair competitive disadvantage b ecause he was 
required by his religious beliefs to keep his store closed on Saturday . Non­
Jewish store owners captured much o f  his b usiness on Saturday, and he was 
denied the opportunity to recoup his losses by staying open on Sunday . 
The Court rej ected this argument,  holding that the state's  interest in a 
uniform day o f  rest , the difficulty o f  administering exceptions , and a p oten­
tial wind fall for the exempted class all outweighed the economic burden 
borne by the plaintiff. 1 3 1 The Court intimated , however, that a state could 
exempt non-Sunday sab batarian b usinesses from its Sunday closing laws 
without o ffending the establishment clause . 1 32 L ater , the state of Kentucky 
did j ust that, and an appeal from the decision upholding the exemption was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court " for want of a substantial federal ques­
tion . ' ' 1 33 
Although we would maintain that the free exercise clause analysis may 
well have been improperly denied applicability to Mr.  Braunfel d ' s  situation,  1 34 
it is apparent that Kentucky' s  voluntary accommodation of such sabbatarian 
religious interests was constitutionally vali d .  Similarly ,  although we believe 
that the government should have been required to meet the standard com-
1 26 .  108 S.  C t .  at 1 326.  
1 27 .  !d. at  1 33 6 .  
1 2 8 .  !d. at  1 33 9 .  
1 29 .  !d. at  1 32 8 .  
1 30 .  3 66 U . S .  599 ( 1 96 1 ) .  
1 3 1 .  !d. at 608-09 . 
1 32 .  !d. at 608 .  
1 3 3 .  Arla n ' s  Dept.  Store,  I nc .  v .  Kentucky , 3 7 1 U . S .  2 1 8  ( 1 962) . 
1 34 .  Bu1 cf. Nme,  New York Get S!atUie, supra note 8 ,  at 1 1 5 3 - 5 8  (arguing Braunfeld was 
correct l y  decided ) .  
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pelling state interest test for i n fringements o f  religious freedom in Lyng, it 
is unquestionable that a decision t o  accommodate the Native American 
religious interests would be constitutio nal . 
In situations involving an exemption from a governmental b u rden , the 
t hreat of an establishment o f  religion is remote,  precisely b ecause government 
has acted to remove a b u rden placed on religion by one o f  its own regulations . 
That removal does not const itute a promotion or endorsement o f  religion. 
Significantly,  an accommodation of a religious claim that was not designed 
to lift a governmentally-imposed burden would run a far higher risk of 
abridging the establishment claus e .  For example, a decision to turn over 
public lands to a religious group that wanted to build a church would be an 
impermissible establishment . This action results in a violation of the estab­
l ishment clause because government would be conferring a benefit on the 
religion,  rather than removing a disability . 1 35 
A final example highlights the importance of limiting accommodation to 
relieving burdens imposed by government , rather than b urdens placed on 
religions by society at large . Government may have an interest  in regulating 
when and where religious activity takes place.  It may n o t ,  h owever , remove 
burdens imposed by the rough and tumble of s ociety.  If a p articular religion, 
such as a group that believes in  soliciting door-to-door and using aggressive 
and persistent proselytizing practices , provokes ridicule or peaceful demon­
strations against such practices , it  would be invalid for the state to  seek to 
alleviate such a socially-imposed burden . 1 36 Quite apart from the free speech 
rights of demonstrators , the state may not interfere in independent religious 
or anti-religious choices that do not otherwise violate the law. Government , 
o f  course ,  could protect the group against violence or physical interference,  
but it could not undertake to ensure that group members would be immune 
from the indignities o f  demonstrations t hat express opposition to the group ' s  
beliefs .  I f  the state were t o  remove a burden imposed b y  social forces , it 
would , in e ffect , be sponsoring that religio n ,  thereby trespassing on t he non­
establishment mandate . 
1 3 5 .  Although t he case ul t imately was decided on standing grounds rather  t h a n  o n  t he merits ,  
Val ley Forge C h rist ian College v .  Americans United for Separa t i o n  o f  Church & State ,  I nc . ,  
454 U . S .  464 ( I  982) ,  i nv olved t axpayers' establ ishment clause challenge t o  t h e  federal govern­
ment 's  transfer of a former mi l i tary h ospital t o  a sectarian college. I n  essence, p la int i ffs alleged 
t hat the government had given a substantial  property award to one denominat i o n ,  much l i k e  
the  hypothetical  we u s e  to i l lustrate a n  impermissible acco m m odatio n .  
1 3 6 .  A series o f  landmark first amendment decisions,  apparently based pr imari ly  o n  t h e  
speech c lause rather t h a n  the free exercise clause, i n volved proselytizing act iv i ties s i m i l ar to 
those described i n  the text . A t  i ssue i n  t hose cases was the j udicial protection of the  r ights  of 
the proselytizers t hemselves, rather than t hose o f  counter-demonstrators .  See, e. g.  Cantwell  v .  
Con nectic u t ,  3 1 0 U . S .  2 9 6  ( 1 940) (reversing convict ion for b reach o f  peace based o n  record 
played by J eh ovah ' s  Witness ) ;  Schneider v .  Stat e ,  308 U . S .  1 47 ( 1 939) ( inval idat ing ant i- l i t ter ing 
ordi nance used t o  convict  Jehova h ' s  'Witnesses w h o  had distr ibut ed rel igious leatlets) : Lovel l  
v .  Griffin , 303 U . S .  444 ( 1 93 8 )  ( inval ida t i ng municipal  statute prohibit ing distr ibution o f  
l i t erat ure withou t  permit after J ehovah ' s  W i tness was convicted o f  violat ing ordinance whi le  
distr ibuting religious l i terature). 
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In short, because the free exercise and establishment clauses are directed 
expressly at governmental actio n ,  the doctrine of accom m odati o n ,  which 
exists in the interstices o f  the two clauses,  m ust also be tied closely to 
governmental acti o n .  By restricting accommodation to instances o f  alleviating 
a burden imposed by government,  the danger of vitiating the establishment 
clause is  avoided. By limiting the doctrine of accommodation to cases in 
which a religious interest rather than a free exercise right is presented , the 
danger of reducing the free exercise clause to a m atter of  voluntary compli­
ance is also a voide d .  
V .  CONCLUSION 
Accommodation is by its very nature a theory of the middle groun d .  By 
confining accommodation to the area between establishment and free exer­
cise , the vitality of both clauses is maintained , and much of the tension that 
has grown up between them is t hereby diminished. The test proposed here,  
while it m ay not resolve all  issues of accom modatio n ,  provides broad guide­
lines for j udges , legislators , and religious groups that must deal with gov­
ernmental burdens on individual believers . 
